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Abstract 
Prior research found that “1-in-X” ratios led to higher and less accurate subjective probability 
than “N-in-X*N” ratios or other formats even though they featured the same mathematical 
information. It is unclear, however, whether the effect transfers into health decisions and the 
practical significance of the effect is undetermined. Based on previous findings and risk 
communication theories, we hypothesised that the “1-in-X” effect would occur and transfer 
into relevant decisions. We also tested whether age, gender and education differences would 
moderate the “1-in-X” effect on decision-making. We conducted three well-powered 
experiments (n = 1912) using a sample from the general adult UK population to test our 
hypotheses, estimated the effect and excluded a possible methodological explanation for such 
a transfer. In hypothetical scenarios, participants decided whether to travel to Kenya given 
the chance of contracting malaria (Experiment 1) and whether to take recommended steroids 
given the side effects (Experiments 2 and 3). Across the experiments, we replicated a small-
to-medium “1-in-X” effect on the perceived probability, Hedge’s g = -0.36, 95% CI [-0.47, -
0.24], z = -6.18, p < .001 and found a small effect on subsequent decisions, OR = 1.32, 95% 
CI [1.10, 1.59], z = 2.99, p = .003. The perceived probability fully mediated the effect of the 
ratio format on decision. Age, gender and education did not moderate the “1-in-X” effect on 
decision. We argue that a high prevalence of “1-in-X” ratios in medical communication 
makes these small changes clinically relevant. Therefore, to communicate information 
accurately, “1-in-X” ratios should not be used or at least used cautiously in medical 
communication. 
Keywords: “1-in-X” effect, subjective probability, risk communication, medical decisions 
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When making informed decisions about our health, an accurate perception of 
probabilistic information is critical. For instance, one can decide against taking steroids if the 
probability of experiencing side effects seems too high. Previous research studied the factors 
that shape subjective probabilities [1, 2]. As part of this research programme, recent studies 
found that “1-in-X” probability ratios (e.g., 1 in 10) consistently yielded higher subjective 
probabilities than the same probability magnitudes expressed as “N-in-X*N” ratios (e.g., 10 
in 100) or percentages (e.g., 10%). This effect has been labelled the “1-in-X” effect [3]. The 
effect has been demonstrated with negative and positive outcomes, using various scenarios, 
replicated in different populations, and using different languages [3-5]. It has also been tested 
in an ecologically valid setting [6]. Based on this research, some called for the ratio to be 
eliminated from medical communication [7, 8]. “1-in-X” ratios are consistently higher than 
other numerical and pictorial formats [3-5] and lead to a larger overestimation of the 
probability compared with “N-in-X*N” ratios when using objective numerical scales [9]. 
This means that probability estimation is biased by “1-in-X” ratios.  
It remains unclear whether the “1-in-X” effect has any practical significance – 
whether the effect on probability perception transfers into decisions. This is important to 
establish because “1-in-X” ratios are currently the most prevalent ratio format used in 
medical communication [10]. Indeed, the majority of family physicians used this format to 
communicate the risks associated with prenatal screening to pregnant women [10]. Both 
decision-making theories and risk communication theories assume that the probability of an 
event (e.g., probability of a side effect) affects decisions involving this event (e.g., taking a 
medicine) [11, 12]. Preliminary evidence also indicated that the format of probability ratios 
affected the decisions expressed as a likelihood of action [9]. However, two drawbacks 
prevented us from drawing firm conclusions from this evidence: (i) the decision measure 
followed the probability question, thus inviting an order effect and (ii) the decision measure 
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was continuous, which does not reflect the dual nature of decisions (e.g., accepting a 
treatment or not).  
The Present Experiments 
The present manuscript details three experiments aimed at tackling the issue of the “1-
in-X” effect on health-related decisions. We had four main goals. First, we aimed to replicate 
the “1-in-X” effect in different scenarios. Second, we investigated whether the different ratios 
affected decisions presented as dichotomous choices: we used the decision to travel to Kenya 
considering the risk of contracting malaria (Experiment 1) and the decision to take steroids 
considering their side effects (Experiments 2 and 3). Whereas the former decision was based 
on a scenario used in the “1-in-X” effect literature [3, 5], the latter decision was based on 
ecologically valid materials taken from the UK’s National Health Service website [13]. We 
also considered the possibility that the effect on decision could be a methodological artefact – 
and that it might occur due to providing an explicit probability rating. We therefore 
manipulated the presentation order of the measures (Experiments 1 and 2). Third, we tested 
whether the subjective probability would mediate the effect on the subsequent decision 
(Experiments 1-3). Finally, we tested whether people of different ages, genders or 
educational backgrounds were more sensitive to the effect of ratio format on decision. For 
that purpose we worked with a large sample of the UK adult population (overall n = 1912). 
We were interested in these relationships because prior research linked these variables with 
risk perception, health literacy and numeracy [14-16], even though such links were not 
detected specifically for the “1-in-X” effect. [5, 9]  
We tested three main hypotheses and one research question. First, we expected that 
the “1-in-X” effect would affect the subjective probabilities across various health-relevant 
scenarios. Second, we expected that the “1-in-X” effect would affect health-related decisions. 
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Third, we expected that the effect would be mediated by the subjective probability 
perception. Finally, we explored the role of gender, age and level of education as possible 
moderators of the “1-in-X” effect on decision.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design. We aimed to recruit at least 597 participants in order to detect a 
small effect (OR = 1.71 ≈ 10% change from 0.2 to 0.3), while using a logistic regression and 
assuming α = .05, 1 - β = .80, and a two-sided test [17]. Therefore, 605 participants were 
recruited from an online panel (Prolific Academic) and completed a questionnaire. Only 
those participants who were at least 18 years old, resided in the UK and – to assure the 
quality of responses [18] – had an approval rating of more than 90% were eligible to 
participate. The participants were paid £1 for completing a 12-minute questionnaire which 
also featured a problem-solving task unrelated to the research reported here. Participants were 
mostly women (69.1%), the majority of whom had completed high school (38.2%) or held an 
undergraduate degree (41.2%). Their ages ranged from 18 to 84 years (M = 36.0, SD = 11.7 
years). The sample consisted of managers and working professionals (25.8%), unemployed 
individuals, including students and homemakers (23.5%), and workers in sales and offices 
(12.6%), services (7.3%) or in another occupation.  
In a 2(ratio: “1-in-X” vs “N-in-X*N”) × 2(response order: probability first vs. 
decision first) between-subjects design, participants assessed the subjective probability of 
contracting malaria while travelling to Kenya and decided whether or not to maintain or 
cancel their booking.  
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Materials and Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants read a scenario 
describing a hypothetical situation in which they had booked a trip to Kenya [3]. In the 
scenario they learnt that the risk of contracting malaria during their trip was around 8%, 
described either with a “1-in-X” ratio (1 in 13) or an “N-in-X*N” ratio (10 in 130). 
Participants expressed their subjective probability of contracting malaria on an 11-point 
Likert scale (anchored as 1: extremely low, 11: extremely high). On the same page, they 
reported their decision to cancel the trip (or not) on a dichotomous Yes/No scale. The 
response options were randomised (see Supplementary Materials for the exact wording). The 
presentation order of the probability and decision questions was counterbalanced. Participants 
then answered questions concerning their age, gender, level of education and occupation 
before being debriefed. 
We followed the APA ethical guidelines when conducting all three experiments. We 
have reported all the experiments, measures, manipulations and exclusions. All data sets, R 
code and materials are available at: https://osf.io/u69jq/.   
 
Results and Discussion 
We found that participants provided higher probability estimates in the “1-in-X” 
condition than in the “N-in-X*N” condition and that this was the case regardless of the order 
of presentation of the questions (Figure 1, panel A). The observed “1-in-X” effect was 
statistically significant, F(1, 601) = 24.52, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 0.04, whereas the main effect of 
order and the interaction term were not, F(1, 601) = 3.60, p = .058, ηp
2
 = 0.01; F(1, 601) = 
0.81, p = .369, ηp
2
 < 0.01, respectively. Thus, we replicated the “1-in-X” effect on the 
subjective perception of the probability reported in the prior research [3, 5].  
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Figure 1: Effect of ratio format and presentation order on the perceived probability 
expressed as the risk of contracting malaria on an 11-point verbal Likert scale, (Panel A) and 
related decision expressed as a proportion of decision to cancel the trip to Kenya (Panel B). 
Note. Panel A: Horizontal lines represent means, boxes represent 95% confidence intervals, 
beans represent smoothed densities, and circles represent individual responses. 
Panel B: Dots represent proportion point estimates and bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
More participants decided to cancel their trip when the risk of contracting malaria was 
presented as a “1-in-X” ratio than an “N-in-X*N” ratio. This effect was slightly stronger 
when participants made their decision before providing a probability estimate rather than 
after (Figure 1, panel B). The interaction between the format and presentation order did not 
add significantly to the main effect model, χ2(1) = 0.24, p = .626, so only the main effect 
model was considered further. In this model, we found a significant effect of the ratio format, 
OR = 1.45, 95% CI [1.04, 2.04], z = 2.19, p = .029 and a non-significant effect of the order, 
OR = 1.20, 95% CI [0.86, 1.68], z = 1.06, p = .289.  
To test the mediation hypothesis, we used a recommended analytical strategy using 
the macro PROCESS that relies on bootstrapped intervals [19, 20]. The total effect of the 
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ratio format on decision, c = 0.37, z = 2.18, p = .029, was fully mediated by the perceived 
probability, since the indirect effect was significant (i.e., bootstrapped CIs did not contain 
zero), ab = 0.41, 95% CIBCa [0.24, 0.59] and the direct effect was substantially reduced and 
no longer significant, c’ = 0.01, z = 0.03, p = .977. Hence, the ratio format affected decision-
making, and this was not caused by an order effect in the tasks. We further established that 
the effect on decision was fully mediated via perceived probability, which is consistent with 
the prior literature on risk perception and with decision theories [12]. It is important to note 
that the mediation analysis does not account for the whole variability in the decision-making 
variable, instead, it accounts for the variability in decision-making caused by the ratio format 
manipulation. 
Age, gender and education level did not moderate the effect of the format on decision 
in three separate logistic regression models  Age (mean-centred) did not significantly affect 
decision and did not significantly interact with the format, OR = 1.01, 95% CI [0.99, 1.03], z 
= 0.68, p = .495; OR = 0.99, 95% CI [0.97, 1.02], z = -0.46, p = .643, respectively. Gender 
(dummy-coded) did not significantly affect decisions and did not significantly interact with 
the format, OR = 0.75, 95% CI [0.44, 1.28], z = -1.07, p = .285; OR = 1.24, 95% CI [0.60, 
2.55], z = 0.59, p = .554, respectively. Education level (recoded here as the dummy-coded 
variable – 0: completed high school education or lower education, n = 239, vs. 1: bachelor 
degree or higher education, n = 366) did not significantly affect decisions and did not 
significantly interact with the format, OR = 1.21, 95% CI [0.74, 2.00], z = 0.76, p = .445; OR 
= 0.68, 95% CI [0.34, 1.36], z = -1.09, p = .275, respectively. We did not find evidence to 
support the fact that people of different ages, genders or educational levels would be more (or 
less) prone to the probability format affecting their decisions. 
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that the ratio format affected the perceived 
probability which then had an impact on decision. In Experiment 2, we wanted to extend the 
robustness of the demonstration to a more realistic and complex health scenario. Therefore, 
we devised a scenario closely mimicking a situation of risk communication to a patient using 
wording from the NHS UK website describing side effects of a recommended drug 
(prednisolone). 
Method 
Participants and Design. The same a priori stopping rule was used as in Experiment 1 (i.e., 
at least 597 participants to detect a small effect). A different sample of 605 participants was 
recruited from an online panel (Prolific Academic). We used the same eligibility criteria as in 
Experiment 1. Participants were mostly women (69.6%), the majority of whom had either 
finished high school (37.9%) or held an undergraduate degree (43.3%). Their ages ranged 
from 18 to 68 years (M = 35.6, SD = 11.6 years). The sample consisted of managers and 
working professionals (25.5%), unemployed individuals, including students and homemakers 
(24.6%), workers in sales and offices (12.9%), in services (6.3%) or in another occupation.  
In a 2(ratio: “1-in-X” vs “N-in-X*N”) × 2(response order: probability first vs. 
decision first) between-subjects design, participants assessed the subjective probability of a 
steroid’s side effect and decided whether or not they would adhere to the medication.  
Materials and Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants read a scenario 
describing a hypothetical situation in which they suffered from a reactive form of arthritis and 
their family physician suggested taking prednisolone to manage their symptoms (see 
Supplementary Materials). They also learnt that the risk of experiencing side effects such as 
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depression and hallucinations while taking prednisolone was around 5%, described either as a 
“1-in-X” ratio (1 in 20) or an “N-in-X*N” ratio (5 in 100). In order to appear as realistic as 
possible, the scenario text was adapted from the NHS website and the prednisolone leaflet. 
Curiously, while the NHS website reported the risk to be 1 in 20, the prednisolone leaflet 
described the risk as 5 in 100. Participants assessed their subjective probability of 
experiencing these side effects on an 11-point Likert scale, (“In your opinion, when taking 
prednisolone, the probability of experiencing changes in your mental state, such as depression 
or hallucinations, is…”, anchored as 1: extremely low, 11: extremely high). They also 
reported their decision as to whether they would take the medication regularly (or not) on a 
dichotomous Yes/No scale, (“Given that the probability of experiencing changes in your 
mental state, such as depression or hallucinations, is 1 in 20 [5 in 100] when taking 
prednisolone, would you regularly take this medication?”) The options were randomised and 
the presentation order of the two questions was systematically counterbalanced. Participants 
then reported their age, gender, level of education and occupation, and were debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
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 We observed substantial variations in probability perception according to the ratio 
format – the “1-in-X” format led to higher probability perception compared with the “N-in-
X*N” format, whereas the probability varied minimally according to the presentation order 
(Figure 2, panel A). The observed “1-in-X” effect was statistically significant, F(1, 601) = 
45.25, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 0.07, whereas the main effect of order and the interaction with the main 
effect of ratio format were not, F(1, 601) = 0.13, p = .723, ηp
2
 < 0.01; F(1, 601) = 0.14, p = 
.705, ηp
2
 < 0.01, respectively. Thus, we replicated the findings from Experiment 1 concerning 
the significant “1-in-X” effect and the non-significant effect of order on probability 
perception. 
 
Figure 2: Effect of ratio format and presentation order on the perceived probability expressed 
as the risk of experiencing side effects on an 11-point verbal Likert scale, (Panel A) and 
related decision expressed as a proportion of decisions not to take prednisolone (Panel B). 
Note. Panel A: Horizontal lines represent means, boxes represent 95% confidence intervals, 
beans represent smoothed densities and circles represent individual responses. 
Panel B: Dots represent proportion point estimates and bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Participants decided not to take the medication (0: to take prednisolone, 1: not to take 
prednisolone) more often when the risk was presented in the “1-in-X” format compared with 
the “N-in-X*N” format, the effect of which was slightly more pronounced in the decision-
first condition (Figure 2, panel B). In the main effect model (adding an interaction term did 
not significantly increase explained variance, χ2(1) = 0.48, p = .486), we found a significant 
effect of the format, OR = 1.61, 95% CI [1.17, 2.22], z = 2.89, p = .004 and a non-significant 
effect of the order, OR = 0.87, 95% CI [0.63, 1.20], z = -0.86, p = .391.  
The total effect of format on decision, c = 0.47, z = 2.88, p = .004, was fully mediated 
by the perceived probability, because the indirect effect was significant (i.e., bootstrapped CIs 
did not contain zero), ab = 0.38, 95% CIBCa [0.24, 0.55]. The direct effect was substantially 
reduced and no longer significant, c’ = 0.13, z = 0.74, p = .457. Yet again we found the “1-in-
X” effect on probability and decision-making. The effect on decision was fully mediated via 
probability perception.  
Age, gender and education level (using the same approach and recoding as in 
Experiment 1) did not moderate the effect of the ratio format on decision, nor did they 
directly impact the decision to adhere to the treatment. Age (mean-centred) did not 
significantly affect decision and did not significantly interact with the format, OR = 1.02, 
95% CI [1.00, 1.04], z = 1.91, p = .057; OR = 0.99, 95% CI [0.96, 1.02], z = -0.73, p = .468, 
respectively. Gender (dummy-coded) did not significantly affect decisions and did not 
significantly interact with the format, OR = 1.42, 95% CI [0.85, 2.40], z = 1.31, p = .189; OR 
= 0.89, 95% CI [0.48, 1.99], z = -0.05, p = .958, respectively. Education level (recoded here 
as a dummy-coded variable – 0: completed high school education or lower education, n = 
238, vs. 1: bachelor degree or higher education, n = 367) did not significantly affect decisions 
and did not significantly interact with the format, OR = 1.25, 95% CI [0.78, 2.01], z = 0.93, p 
= .351; OR = 0.76, 95% CI [0.39, 1.46], z = -0.83, p = .405, respectively. Thus, we did not 
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find evidence that people of different ages, genders or education levels would be more (or 
less) prone to the format affecting their decision-making process. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, we aimed to replicate the effect of the ratio format on probability perception 
and decision in a sample balanced in terms of gender and with more variance in age and 
education, using different ratios (1 in 20 vs. 10 in 200) and with delayed presentation of the 
decision-making question (i.e., presented on a subsequent page). This aimed to test the 
robustness of the effect on decision-making, specifically whether the effect on decision is 
dependent on mental representations of risk stored in short-term memory as is often the case 
in real-life decisions. Since we found no order effects on probability and decision, we 
presented the measures in a fixed order: the main variable of interest – decision-making – 
was always presented first and the probability question second. 
Method 
Participants and Design. A similar power consideration was applied to define an a priori 
stopping rule as in the previous experiments. A sample of 831 participants was recruited from 
a different online panel to that of Experiments 1 and 2 (Bilendi) which was part of a larger 
study investigating other health-related topics. The sample composition roughly matched the 
composition of the UK adult population in terms of age, gender, education and living area. 
Only those participants who were at least 18 years old, resided in the UK, and answered all 
the dependent variable questions were included in the final sample. Since we did not have 
control over the quality of responses, we measured the time people took to read the scenario 
and excluded those who were rushing – i.e., those who read the scenario in less than 8.9 
seconds, which was a third of the median time required for reading the scenario. This was an 
a priori exclusion rule that is part of the standard operating procedures of the lab and is 
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applied consistently in other papers [21]. The final sample was composed of 702 participants: 
52.8% women, 46.4% men and 0.6% transgender or gender variant, 1 missing answer; 28.3% 
completed a GCSE, 15.5% an A-level and 34.7% a degree, whereas others held an 
apprenticeship (3.6%), some other qualification (13.3%) or no qualification at all (4.6%). The 
participants’ ages were measured in age categories (in years) to facilitate the quota sampling: 
18-24 (3.6%), 25-34 (13.4%), 35-44 (20.2%), 45-54 (21.2%), 55-64 (19.9%) and 65-74 
(21.1%); four participants did not provide this information. The sample consisted of full-time 
workers (38.2%), retired people (26.8%), unemployed (13.4%), part-time workers (11.4%) 
and students (1.6%); six participants did not provide this information.  
In a simple between-subjects design, in which we manipulated ratio (“1-in-X” vs “N-
in-X*N”), participants decided whether or not they would adhere to the medication and 
assessed the subjective probability of a steroids’ side effect.  
Materials and Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants answered socio-
demographic questions and some questions that were irrelevant to the reported research. They 
then read the same prednisolone scenario as in Experiment 2. The risk of experiencing side 
effects such as depression and hallucinations was described either as a “1-in-X” ratio (1 in 
20) or an “N-in-X*N” ratio (10 in 200). On a separate page, participants reported their 
decision as to whether they would take the medication regularly (or not) using the same 
questions and scales as in Experiment 2; the options were presented in a random order. On 
the next page, participants assessed their subjective probability of experiencing the side effect 
using the same wording and scale as in Experiment 2. Participants were then debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
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We observed that the “1-in-X” ratio increased the perceived probability only slightly 
compared with the “N-in-X*N” condition (Figure 3, panel A). The observed “1-in-X” effect 
was not statistically significant, F(1, 700) = 2.71, p = .100, ηp
2
 = 0.004.  
 
Figure 3: Effect of ratio format on the perceived probability expressed as the risk of 
experiencing side effects on an 11-point verbal Likert scale, (Panel A) and related decision 
expressed as a proportion of decisions not to take prednisolone (Panel B). 
Note. Panel A: Horizontal lines represent means, boxes represent 95% confidence intervals, 
beans represent smoothed densities and circles represent individual responses. 
Panel B: Dots represent proportion point estimates and bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
We found that the “1-in-X” ratio caused only a small increase in the proportion of 
decisions not to take prednisolone (0: to take prednisolone, 1: not to take prednisolone) 
compared with the “N-in-X*N” ratio (Figure 3, panel B). We found a non-significant effect 
of the format, OR = 1.04, 95% CI [0.77, 1.40], z = 0.25, p = .802 (i.e., the direction was 
consistent with the “1-in-X” effect). Since we did not find a statistically significant or 
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substantial effect we did not run a mediation analysis of the “1-in-X” effect on decision via 
probability perception. 
Neither age nor gender moderated the effect of the format on decision, whereas 
education level did moderate the magnitude of the effect. Age (treated as a scale variable here 
and mean-centred prior analysis) did not significantly affect decision and did not significantly 
interact with the format, OR = 1.16, 95% CI [1.00, 1.35], z = 1.96, p = .050; OR = 1.02, 95% 
CI [0.83, 1.26], z = 0.22, p = .825, respectively. Gender (dummy-coded; excluding a few 
answers in the other categories) did not significantly affect decisions nor interact with the 
format, OR = 1.32, 95% CI [0.86, 2.03], z = 1.27, p = .203; OR = 0.90, 95% CI [0.49, 1.64], z 
= -0.35, p = .725, respectively. Education level (dummy coded; 0: lower education level – no 
qualification, apprenticeship, GCSE; 1: higher education level – 2+ A-levels and degree+; 
other qualification was excluded since it is a mixed category) did not significantly affect 
decisions but did significantly interact with the format, OR = 1.30, 95% CI [0.81, 2.09], z = 
1.07, p = .283; OR = 0.50, 95% CI [0.26, 0.96], z = -2.09, p = .036, respectively. Those with 
lower levels of education were more prone to the “1-in-X” effect than those with higher 
education levels for whom the effect was in the opposite direction. Thus, age and gender did 
not interact with the format in their effect on decision-making, whereas education level did. 
Data Synthesis: Estimating the “1-in-X” Effect on Probability and Decision 
To summarise the “1-in-X” effect on subjective probability and decision across the 
experiments reported here (see Table 1 for summary), we computed an internal meta-analysis 
using fixed and random effect models with the R package metafor [22]. We found a small-to-
medium and statistically significant “1-in-X” effect on perceived probability across the three 
experiments using a fixed effect model, Hedge’s g = -0.36, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.24], z = -6.18, p 
< .001 (a random effect model yielded a similar conclusion, g = -0.36, 95% CI[-0.60, -0.11]). 
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We found a small “1-in-X” effect on health decision across the three experiments using a 
fixed effect model, OR = 1.32, 95% CI [1.10, 1.59], z = 2.99, p = .003 (a random effect model 
yielded similar results, OR = 1.33, 95% CI [1.02, 1.74]). The odds of mitigating the risk – by 
cancelling a trip or by not adhering to a treatment – were 24% more likely when the risk was 
quantified as a “1-in-X” ratio than when the risk was quantified as an “N-in-X*N” ratio. 
When we pooled the data from the three experiments, we found an approximate 12% absolute 
risk difference (414/951 vs. 537/961), which means that being exposed to the “1-in-X” ratio 
brought 12 excess decisions to mitigate the risk per 100 decisions compared with the “N-in-
X*N” ratio.  
 
Table 1: Effect of ratio manipulation on the perceived probability and related decisions 
(Experiment 1: cancelling a trip abroad; Experiments 2 and 3: not taking the recommended 
medicine). 
 Probability  Decision 
 “N-in-X*N” 
M (SD) 
“1-in-X” 
M (SD) 
 “N-in-X*N” 
% 
“1-in-X” 
% 
Experiment 1 5.2 (2.6) 6.3 (2.8)  30.8 39.3 
Experiment 2 3.8 (2.3) 5.1 (2.6)  41.2 53.0 
Experiment 3 4.9 (2.5) 5.2 (2.8)  56.6 57.6 
 
General Discussion 
In three well-powered experiments, we found that “1-in-X” ratios led to higher 
probability perception compared with “N-in-X*N” ratios. The overall “1-in-X” effect was 
small-to-medium sized. Critically, “1-in-X” ratios altered the subsequent health decisions: 
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more people cancelled the trip abroad to remedy the risk of contracting an illness 
(Experiment 1) and more people did not adhere to the recommended treatment considering 
the risk of experiencing side effects (Experiment 2; but not significantly so in Experiment 3); 
the overall effect size was small. The effect on decision cannot be explained as a 
methodological artefact, i.e. as an expressed consequence of making a probability judgment 
prior to making a decision, given that we did not find that the order of the questions mattered 
(Experiments 1 and 2). The format effect on decision was fully mediated by the perceived 
probability of contracting the illness (Experiment 1) or experiencing side effects (Experiment 
2). Socio-demographic indicators – age, gender and education – did not moderate the effect 
on decision with the exception of a higher sensitivity to the “1-in-X” effect for those less 
educated (Experiment 3). Our findings are consistent with prior research that demonstrated 
the “1-in-X” effect on probability perception [3-5]. The effect size is similar to that found in 
the recent meta-analysis which included some null findings [5]. The “1-in-X” effect on 
decisions and its mediation via subjective probability is consistent with prior evidence on the 
link between probability and decision [1, 12] and is also aligned with current theories of 
decision-making, in which perceived probability along with perceived utility are expected to 
determine decision-making such as the prospect theory [11].  
To draw up the practical implications of our findings, we need to interpret the small 
effect on decision identified here in terms of practical significance. However, before drawing 
any conclusion, we need to cover two important caveats of our research: one concerning the 
size of the effect and one concerning the context in which such interpretations are made. 
First, the effects generally reported in the literature are inflated [23] because of a bias 
favouring the publication of significant results, which might distort our perception of effect 
size. Here, we have transparently reported all of the three studies we conducted to assess the 
practical significance of the “1-in-X” effect, hence we believe that our estimate of the effect 
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size does not suffer from such a distortion. Due to the high prevalence of “1-in-X” ratios in 
health communication, the small effect on decision can have a big cumulative effect [10]. 
Second, we have considered a context of informed decision-making where the objective is to 
communicate the information as accurately as possible. However, there might be different 
contexts such as health change and persuasion, in which practitioners might wish to 
emphasise the risks and therefore use “1-in-X” ratios. 
Bearing these caveats in mind, we need to pay further consideration to the costs and 
benefits associated with the change of formats following the framework of determining a 
sufficiently important difference [24]. Given the small but cumulative harmful effect that the 
“1-in-X” ratios can bring to patients, and considering the fact that there is virtually no cost 
involved in changing the format, we believe that the ratio should be used sparsely. This 
conclusion is aligned with the calls to abandon “1-in-X” ratios [8]. 
One possible limitation in our research is whether or not we can trust the conclusion 
since we have presented mixed findings (two out of three experiments were significant). 
First, by conducting an internal meta-analysis, we demonstrated that the effect is present and 
statistically significant. Second, the mixed findings are far more common than they are 
reported. We can calculate the support for the null and alternative hypothesis in our research 
[25]. The probability of two out of three studies being significant, given the assumption that 
the alternative hypothesis is true (while having 80% power) is 38.4% and only 0.7% given 
the assumption that the null hypothesis is true (while having 5% alpha). The likelihood ratio 
(LR) then compares how well the two hypotheses predict the data; in this case LR = 
0.384/0.007 = 55, which indicates that the observed results are around 55 times more likely to 
occur under the assumption that the alternative hypothesis is true rather than under the 
assumption that the null hypothesis is true [25]. Another limitation of our studies is that we 
focused on hypothetical decisions. Future research should focus on the impact of ratios on 
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actual rather than hypothetical decisions. The evidence available so far pinpoints the fact that 
there are no big differences in the perceived probability between hypothetical and actual 
situations of probability assessment in different studies [3, 6, 26], which indicates that we can 
expect to observe similar findings in real life as we have found in hypothetical situations. 
Finally, the current research does not address the issue of the psychological processes 
underlying the “1-in-X” effect. Future research should clarify these processes and test 
proposals suggested in prior research such as gist interpretation [8], ease of imagination [4], 
or association with severity and its subsequent overestimation [10]. 
To conclude, we found that “1-in-X” ratios led to higher subjective probability 
perception compared with “N-in-X*N” ratios. This difference drove the changes in decisions. 
We also found that people of different ages, genders or education levels were not more prone 
to these changes. Due to the high prevalence of “1-in-X” ratios, the relatively small effect of 
these ratios grows into a cumulative effect on decision-making, which might obscure 
informed decision-making. As there are minimal costs associated with the format use, health 
communicators wanting to promote accurate risk perceptions should use “N-in-X*N” ratios 
instead. 
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Supplementary Materials 
Experiment 1: Materials 
Kenya Scenario 
Imagine that you have booked a trip to Kenya and you now learn that the risk of being 
infected by malaria during your trip to Kenya is 1 in 13 [10 in 130]. 
Questions 
Given this risk, would you cancel your trip to Kenya? 
 No 
 Yes 
 
In your opinion, the probability of being infected by malaria during your trip to Kenya is . . . 
 
Extremely 
low 
                  
Extremely 
high 
                        
 
Note. In the “1-in-X” condition, 1 in 13 ratio was used, whereas in the “N-in-X*N” condition, 
10 in 130 ratio was used (shown in squared brackets here). The order of the questions was 
systematically counterbalanced. 
 
Socio-demographic questions 
What is your age? 
[Participants selected one option out of the range of values between 18 and 100] 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
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What is your occupation? 
 Management, professional, and related 
 Service 
 Sales and office 
 Farming, fishing, and forestry 
 Construction, extraction, and maintenance 
 Production, transportation, and material moving 
 Government 
 Retired 
 Unemployed (including students and homemakers) 
 Other 
 
Which of the following best describes your highest achieved education level?  
 Less than High School 
 Finished High School 
 Undergraduate Degree 
 Master's Degree 
 Doctoral (PhD) or Professional (JD, MD) Degree 
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Experiment 2: Materials 
Prednisolone Scenario 
Please imagine that you have developed a condition called reactive arthritis. Reactive arthritis 
causes inflammation (redness and swelling) in various places in the body. It usually develops 
following an infection, and in most cases clears up in a few months without causing long-
term problems. Your symptoms include joint pain, tenderness and swelling, lower back pain, 
swelling of your fingers and watery eyes.  Due to your stomach condition, you’re unable to 
use ibuprofen which is usually used for treatment. Your GP suggests instead that you take a 
steroid medication: prednisolone.   Your GP tells you that the probability of experiencing 
changes in your mental state, such as depression or hallucinations, associated with taking 
prednisolone is 1 in 20 [5 in 100]. 
Questions 
Given that the probability of experiencing changes in your mental state, such as depression or 
hallucinations, is 1 in 20 [5 in 100] when taking prednisolone, would you regularly take this 
medication? 
 No 
 Yes 
 
In your opinion, when taking prednisolone the probability of experiencing changes in your 
mental state, such as depression or hallucinations, is: 
 
Extremely 
low 
                  
Extremely 
high 
                        
 
Note. In the “1-in-X” condition, 1 in 20 ratio was used, whereas in the “N-in-X*N” condition, 
5 in 100 ratio was used (shown in squared brackets here). The order of the questions was 
systematically counterbalanced. The materials were adjusted from the NHS website. 
Socio-demographic questions 
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What is your age? 
[Participants selected one option out of the range of values between 18 and 100] 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
What is your occupation? 
 Management, professional, and related 
 Service 
 Sales and office 
 Farming, fishing, and forestry 
 Construction, extraction, and maintenance 
 Production, transportation, and material moving 
 Government 
 Retired 
 Unemployed (including students and homemakers) 
 Other 
 
Which of the following best describes your highest achieved education level?  
 Less than High School 
 Finished High School 
 Undergraduate Degree 
 Master's Degree 
 Doctoral (PhD) or Professional (JD, MD) Degree 
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Experiment 3: Materials 
Instruction 
Now, you are going to read a hypothetical scenario concerning your health, in which you will 
be asked to make a health-related decision. Please note that the general information provided 
in the scenario are actual information taken from NHS. 
Prednisolone Scenario 
Please imagine that you have developed a condition called reactive arthritis. Reactive arthritis 
causes inflammation (redness and swelling) in various places in the body. It usually develops 
following an infection, and in most cases clears up in a few months without causing long-
term problems. Your symptoms include joint pain, tenderness and swelling, lower back pain, 
swelling of your fingers and watery eyes.  Due to your stomach condition, you’re unable to 
use ibuprofen which is usually used for treatment. Your GP suggests instead that you take a 
steroid medication: prednisolone.  Your GP tells you that the probability of experiencing 
changes in your mental state, such as depression or hallucinations, associated with taking 
prednisolone is 1 in 20. [10 in 200]. 
Questions 
Given that the probability of experiencing changes in your mental state, such as depression or 
hallucinations, is 1 in 20 [10 in 200] when taking prednisolone, would you regularly take this 
medication? 
 No 
 Yes 
 
In your opinion, when taking prednisolone the probability of experiencing changes in your 
mental state, such as depression or hallucinations, is: 
 
Extremely 
low 
                  
Extremely 
high 
                        
 
Note. In the “1-in-X” condition, 1 in 20 ratio was used, whereas in the “N-in-X*N” condition, 
10 in 200 ratio was used (shown in squared brackets here). The order of the questions was 
fixed: the probability question always followed the decision question. The materials were 
adjusted from the NHS website. 
Socio-demographic questions 
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To which gender identity do you most identify? 
 Male  
 Female  
 Transgender male  
 Transgender female  
 Gender variant/Non-conforming  
 I do not wish to answer this question  
 
What is your type of occupation? 
 Full-time  
 Part-time  
 Self-employed  
 Student  
 Unemployed  
 Retired  
 
What is your highest level of education? 
 GCSE  
 2+ A-level  
 Degree+  
 Apprenticeship  
 Other Qualification  
 No Qualification  
 
How old are you? 
 18-24  
 25-34  
 35-44  
 45-54  
 55-64  
 65-74  
 
 
 
 
